

Helping People Choose Careers in the Age of AI

Jennifer L. Steele (steele@american.edu)
Isabella Cruz (ig0189a@american.edu)
American University

Association of Education Finance and Policy

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Outline

- 1 Motivation and Objective
- 2 Analytic Strategy
- 3 Results: Generalized Work Activity Automation Exposure
- 4 Results: Occupational Automation Exposure
- 5 Summary
- 6 Appendix

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Current impact of AI on jobs is uncertain

- Anthropic: 36% of jobs are using AI for at least a quarter of their tasks (Handa et al., 2025)
- Since 2023, freelance job postings in writing and programming dropped 21% (Demirci et al., 2025)
- Since 2023, employment is falling fastest (up to 13%) for early-career workers in careers with highest exposure to *automation*, not *augmentation* (Brynjolfsson et al., 2025)
- *Automation tasks*, comprising 56% of work ChatGPT queries, 40% of Claude queries, and 70% of Claude API queries, are defined as **directive tasks and feedback loops**
- *Augmentation tasks* involve **iteration, validation, learning, or other queries** (Appel et al., 2025; Handa et al., 2025)

What will jobs look like in the age of AI?

- 1 Following Autor et al. (2003) and others, we treat 923 occupations (O*NET SOC Codes) as baskets of about 19,265 tasks, 2,069 Detailed Work Activities (DWAs), and 41 Generalized Work Activities (GWAs)
- 2 For GWAs-level aggregates, we weight automation exposure scores by the relative importance of GWA to the job
- 3 Examine how ours and 5 other sets of estimates differ by estimation method, job education level, salary, complexity, interest category, and job sector

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We compare six automation-prediction models

Table 1: Models Under Consideration

| Article | How | Measure |
|--------------------------------|----------------------------------|---|
| Steele & Cruz (2026) | Anthropic & GPT queries | % of job tasks automatable |
| Eloundou et al. (2024) | GPT & human raters | % of job tasks automatable |
| Felten et al. (2021) | Crowd-sourced | Job ability automation suitability |
| Webb (2020) | Text-mining for semantic overlap | AI patent filings & job descriptions |
| Brynjolfsson & Mitchell (2017) | Crowd-sourced w/ rubric | Task suitability for machine learning (SML) |
| Frey & Osborne (2017) | Human raters | Abilities that are not social, creative, or dexterous |

Our empirical measure employs 2025 Claude and OpenAI usage

Using query data from 2025 for Appel et al. (2025) and Chatterji et al. (2025), we define the following:

GWA Exposure

=**80** if in the top decile of Claude, Claude API, or OpenAI queries (>7% of queries)

=**45** if 50th to 90th percentiles (1-7% of queries)

=**10** if below 50th percentile (<1% of queries)

We aggregate GWAs to jobs, weighting by relative importance

Pre-Standardized Scales Vary by Model


Table 2: Models Under Consideration

| Model | nJobs | Mean | SD | Min | Max |
|-----------------|-------|------|-----|-------|-----|
| Steele (2026) | 872 | 39 | 2.7 | 31 | 48 |
| Eloundou (2024) | 872 | 32 | 19 | 0 | 84 |
| Felten (2021) | 759 | .042 | 1 | -2.7 | 1.5 |
| Webb (2020) | 720 | .42 | .29 | 0 | 1.5 |
| Brynjolf(2018) | 923 | 3.5 | .11 | 2.8 | 3.9 |
| Frey (2017) | 689 | .5 | .38 | .0028 | .99 |


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Tasks vary widely in LLM use patterns




Augmentation is relatively high in coaching, teaching, advising




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
Model predictions are re-scaled in SD units




Models yield heterogeneous signals



Newer models show exposure rising with occupational level



Newer models show greater exposure at higher salaries



Job category exposure by model

Table 3: Which job categories show greatest exposure, by model?


| Model | JobZone | RIASEC | Sector |
|---------------------|-------------|-------------------|------------------------------------|
| Steele (Queries) | Adv (0.97) | Investigat (0.99) | Compu/Math (1.6) Legal (1.6) |
| Eloundou (Possible) | Bach (0.74) | Conventional (53) | Office (1.5) Compu/Math (1.3) |
| Felten (Crowd) | Adv (0.96) | Investigat (85.7) | Compu/Math (1.4) Legal (1.4) |
| Webb (Patents) | Bach (0.34) | Investigat (38.8) | Engineer (0.85) Compu/Math (0.77) |
| Brynjolf (Crowd) | Bach (0.28) | Conventional (66) | Office (1.3) Sales (0.8) |
| Frey (Theory) | <HS (0.85) | Conventional (67) | Office (0.91) Manufacturing (0.85) |

Most-exposed jobs by model

Table 4: Which jobs show the highest automation exposure, by model?

| | | |
|---|--|---|
| <p><i>Steele (Queries)</i> Environmental Economist Law Clerk Mathematician</p> | <p><i>Eloundou (Possible)</i> Credit Authorizer Telemarketer Telephone Operator</p> | <p><i>Felten (Crowd)</i> Actuary Financial Examiner Genetic Counselor</p> |
| <p><i>Webb (Patents)</i> Civil Engineer Tech Political Scientist Wastewater Plant Oper</p> | <p><i>Brynjolf (Crowd)</i> Concierge Mechanical Drafter Mortician</p> | <p><i>Frey (Theory)</i> Cargo & Freight Agent Data Entry Keyer Insurance Underwriter</p> |

Realistic, social, & enterprising: least exposed in 4 recent models



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
Summary

- 1 Automation exposure predictions vary by researcher methods
- 2 People are using chatbots to code, write, and explain
- 3 Chatbot use for social job tasks is more augmented than automated
- 4 Older predictions may under-emphasize scientific and creative exposure
- 5 Least-exposed across models: realistic, social, & enterprising jobs


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
Chatbot *usage* shows high scientific and social exposure




GPT-based automation predictions show high conventional exposure



Patents show high exposure for physical and scientific jobs



Machine learning estimates show less exposure of high-stakes work



"The Turing Trap" versus "Machines of Loving Grace"



"The distributive effects of AI depend on whether it is primarily used to augment human labor or automate and replace it."

–Erik Brynjolfsson, 2022. The Turing trap. *Daedalus*, 151(2).

"We simply need to break the link between the generation of economic value and self-worth and meaning."

–Dario Amodei, 2026, Jan. The adolescence of technology, essay citing Almodei's 2024 essay, "Machines of loving grace."

The economic payoff of work varies by interest





Returns to GWA category employ its relative importance across jobs

$medsal_j = \alpha + \beta relimportance_{gj} + \epsilon_j$ where:


- $relimportance_{gj}$ is relative importance (0-100) of activity category g in occupation j
- $medsal_j$ is median salary of occupation j in 2022\$ in 2022

GWA Salary Differentials Positively Linked to Automation Exposure

Regressing salary differentials on exposure, standardized betas: 0.23, 0.41, & 0.03.



Generalized Work Activity exposure measures vary



Robustness checks examined

- 1 Divide by 2 if more than 60% of Claude or 30% of Claude API queries are augmented instead of automated
- 2 Augmentation exposure: 65, 45, 25, 5 for augmentation percentiles of 90+, 75-90, 50-75, <50
- 3 Automation exposure: 33, 23, 13, 3 for automation percentiles of 90+, 75-90, 50-75, <50
- 4 Aggregate 19k task percents to job level, convert to centiles, average Claude and ChatGPT

Is it reasonable to promote augmentation vs. automation?

Table 5: AI as Human Substitute versus Complement

| Automation | Augmentation |
|--------------------------------|--|
| Automatic Defibrillation | Vital Sign Monitor |
| Write Your Lit Review | Find and Synthesize New Sources |
| Build Your App | Expand Your Coding Skills |
| Grade Student Essays | Generate Rubrics and Grading Templates |
| Do Your Algebra Homework | Explain Key Algebra Concepts |
| Conduct Your Data Analyses | Provide Summary Stats & Suggestions |
| Establish Strategic Priorities | Suggest Priorities to Consider |

What may matter for teaching and learning

- College as apprenticeships, with hands-on problem-solving
- Helping students learn *with* the tools (augmented learning)
- Modeling ethical use:
 - ▶ Learning, not just submitting
 - ▶ Exploring, not just writing
 - ▶ Validating, not just building
 - ▶ Others...

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